Is the Bank of Russia Part of the Global MIB (Military Industrial Banking complex) or Are They Pulling a Rope-a-Dope with Gold?
When the Bank of Russia announced that it was pegging 1 gram of gold to the price of 5,000 rubles on 28 March until 30 June, it quickly had the gold price manipulators in London and New York on the ropes as the ruble quickly strengthened against the USD and nearly recouped all the severe losses thrust upon in by various NATO economic sanctions against Russia. However, more importantly, it had the London and New York gold price manipulators on the ropes in a manner in which the regulators have never done in the history of global banking and finance. In fact, the development that materialized as a consequence of the Bank of Russia’s 5,000 ruble to 1Au gram was far more impactful and important to the future of this racket than even the September 2020 US DOJ (Department of Justice) fine of nearly a billion dollars ($920M) levied against JP Morgan for fraudulent precious metal price manipulation payable to the CFTC (Commodities Futures Trading Commission).
Since simple math and deduction informed us that JP Morgan likely reaped billions of dollars through repeatedly artificially and illegally crashing gold, silver, platinum and palladium prices, the fine was all for show and never meant to actually change criminal JP Morgan banker behavior. In fact, if I were a betting man, I would bet, despite this fine, that JP Morgan bankers are still immorally, unethically and illegally suppressing gold and silver prices in derivative markets right now. So, why was the Bank of Russia ruble peg to gold far more impactful than any puny fine levied against Wall Street bullion banks for the short time it was enacted, and why did the Bank of Russia let the MIB (Military Industrial Banking complex) manipulators off the ropes when clearly they could have kept the pressure elevated and therefore, kept the manipulators on the ropes in a position of extreme discomfort?
In this article, I implied that the Bank of Russia prematurely ended the ruble to gold peg on 7 April, at practically the same USD gold price at which they initially imposed the peg on 28 March, simply to allow gold prices to rise again because of the extreme discount in gold prices produced in Moscow compared to the global market induced by the peg. I was wrong and I got it backwards.
In the referenced article above, published on 6 April, I wrote the following:
“Russia’s decision to peg 5,000 rubles to 1 gram of gold has likely sealed gold’s immediate price fate at sub-$1,900, in direct contradiction to the opinion of many analysts that predict the Russian gold put will imminently push gold above the $2,000 mark for the third time this year.”
On 25 April, just three weeks after I published the article, gold hit an intraday low of $1,891.5 and at the start of May has plunged below $1,900 again, just as I had predicted. So why would I say that my analysis of the Russian ruble gold peg was wrong?
Because of what happened after 7 April, when the Bank of Russia promptly conducted an unexpected about face and discontinued their ruble to gold peg. As I stated above, since I correctly predicted that a Russian gold peg sealed gold’s immediate fate to a sub-$1,900 price, I initially believed that the Bank of Russia discontinued the peg to allow gold’s price to rise. And for a New York minute, when gold’s price indeed rose to a high of $1,998.46 on 18 April after the Bank of Russia discontinued its ruble gold peg, it appeared that my analysis for this action was also correct. But I was wrong.
I should not have been duped so easily into making this conclusion and I should have known that in the opaque world of gold, nothing is ever as it first appears. Thus, shame on me for thinking that the reason for the discontinuation of the Bank of Russia’s ruble to gold peg could possibly be so simplistic.
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